BrigGen (Inf) Glenny Kairupan
Officer in TNI headquarters without clear job description
Glenny Kairupan was 'security advisor', with MajGen Zacky Makarim, to the Dili-based Special Committee for the East Timor Ballot (Satgas Panitia Penentuan Pendapat Timor Timur, P3TT). This team was accredited to liaise with Unamet. However, KPP HAM suspected the team did more than merely liaise. It was appointed in May 1999 and began its work early in June.
What few details we know about Glenny Kairupan's activities in 1999 all revolve around his role in organising militia violence. On 18 June he allegedly took part in a meeting at the Dili military headquarters (Korem) together with his superiors MajGen Zacky Makarim, Army Chief of Staff operations assistant MajGen Kiki Syahnakri, Korem commander Col Tono Suratman, and several militia leaders. The meeting drew up two comprehensive contingency plans. One attempted to derail the vote, either during the three month run-up period or on polling day in August, through coordinated violence.
A second, far more complex, contingency plan was prepared in case the vote was held and went against Indonesia. This involved using the militias to reject the results and to demand that East Timor be partitioned, with the western districts (particularly Covalima, Bobonaro and Ambeno) remaining with Indonesia. Additional measures called for the forced relocation of the local population across the border into West Timor, so that there would be no population to object, and potentially flooding non-East Timorese back across the border to repopulate these regions. These plans were ambitious, indeed partially unrealistic, but they lie at the root of the post-referendum events.
One disaffected militia leader who later acknowledged that Glenny Kairupan was among the military officers who organised the militias was Tomas Goncalves. Kairupan was said to have a very good understanding of the political configuration of East Timor dating from his earlier tenure there, but, being less well known than Zacky or Kiki, he was less likely to attract media attention.
On 30 August, the day of the ballot, Glenny Kairupan took part in a similar meeting, again attended by his team mates Zacky Makarim and Kiki Syahnakri, and held at the official residence of military commander Tono Suratman. The meeting decided that a 'very big riot' would break out at the moment of the ballot result announcement, then scheduled for 7 September (see Kiki Syahnakri).
On 2 September, in the lull before the storm he and his colleagues were about to unleash, Kairupan told the Indonesian Protestant newspaper Suara Pembaruan that what the confused people of East Timor most needed at this time of crisis was 'the religious touch of a spiritual leader', rather than more political talk. 'I greatly regret that Bishop Belo has until now not held any special masses to pray for peace', he added.
Born in 1949, Glenny Kairupan graduated from the 1972 class of the military academy (Akabri) in Magelang. He was deputy commander of the East Timor command (Korem 164/ Wira Dharma) in 1995, but was unexpectedly passed over as commander by Mahidin Simbolon. One source says he has a Kopassus background and maintains his links there.Enjoyed some US training while a Lieutenant (initially as a helicopter pilot). He is regarded as a hardliner.
'Diakui, ada aparat lepas tembakan di jalan-jalan', Kompas, 31 December 1999.
Douglas Kammen, 'The trouble with normal: The Indonesian military, paramilitaries, and the final solution in East Timor,' in Benedict Anderson, ed., Violence and the state in Suharto's Indonesia, Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 2001; 'Revealed: army’s plot to destroy a nation,' The Guardian, 11 September 1999.
Aksi News Service, `Penguasa Militer Baru di Timor Timur', Jakarta, 27 May 1995, email@example.com, internet, 3 June 1995.